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Thu Apr 3 08:20:14 2008The price-iso return locus and rational 
rate regulation 
William J. Baumol," 
Dietrich Fischer,"" 
and 
Thijs ten Raa*** 
The price-iso  return locus for  a regulated multiproduct jirm  shows all price 
vectors giving the rate of return permitted by regulation. The locus  for any two 
products  is shown to have both negatively and positively  sloping  segments. 
A price  vector on a positively  sloped segment is socially inefficient, because 
both prices  can be cut without reducing rate of return.  Yet, regulatory policy 
may  force firms into such parts of the locus. Other significant properties of the 
locus are derived, including  the relation of its shape to demand elasticities 
and its implications for  cross subsidy and for Ramsey optimality. 
1. Introduction 
This paper uses a simple construct, the price-iso return locus, to describe 
and analyze the full range of pricing options for the multiproduct firm under rate 
of return regulation. This is the locus of all points in price space which yield 
exactly the rate of return permitted by the regulator. A characteristic shape is 
derived for that locus and is shown to have significant implications for con- 
troversies in the area of rate regulation such as the appropriate test of cross 
subsidy and the use of a full-cost pricing criterion, on the assumption that strictly 
static analysis is appropriate throughout. 
Specifically, the following results emerge from the analysis. First, there will 
generally be some segments of the locus along which there is cross subsidy of 
one product by  the other, while  along other portions of  the locus no cross 
subsidy occurs. These sections are readily distinguished by the shape of the 
locus. Second, there will generally be a segment of the locus which involves 
inefficiency in the sense that from any point in such a segment one can move 
to another price vector which is preferable to all consumers of any of the firm's 
products and is, at the very least, not detrimental to the regulated supplying firm. 
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Third, regulatory pricing principles, such as fully distributed cost pricing, which 
are often advocated by competitors of the regulated firm, can drive prices to a 
point on an inefficient segment of the locus. Finally, a Ramsey price vector 
(a  vector of prices that are Pareto optimal under a profit constraint) will generally 
not lie at a point in an inefficient segment of the locus. But it may conceivably 
lie on a segment along which there is cross subsidy of one product by another. 
One of the major implications of the analysis is that a piecemeal criterion 
for the testing of  cross subsidy is highly  unsatisfactory. It is not possible to 
analyze this issue by means of a procedure which deals with a firm's products 
in isolation and ignores the multiproduct character of the enterprise.' 
It should be emphasized that the price-iso return locus is  simply an iso 
(rate of)  profit curve in price space. Such curves have appeared in the literature 
before (see, for example, Panzar and Willig (1977),  Baumol (1959)). But so 
far as we know, the shape of these loci has never been explored systematically 
bef~re.~ And, indeed, some previously unanticipated features of this locus turn 
up in the analysis. 
2. The construct and its basic properties 
W  To determine the set of price vectors available to a regulated firm which is 
subject to a rate of return constraint, let 
R = the total revenue function 
C = the total cost function (excluding the cost of ~apital)~ 
k = the quantity of capital input (measured in money terms) 
y  = the output vector 
p  = the vector of output prices 
r = the cost of capital (the normal or competitive rate of return), and 
r* = the regulated rate of return on capital (the "fair  rate of return"). 
Then constancy of rate of return requires 
(R - C)/k = r* = constant  or  .rr  = R - C - r*k  = 0.  (1) 
We shall refer to .rr as the excess profit, that is, the profit in excess of the "fair 
return on capital,"  r*k. Taking input prices to be given, each of the variable 
components of the excess profit is a function of y (with R also a function of p), 
which is itself a function ofp.  Therefore, our excess profit relationship (1) can 
be written 
.rr(p) = 0.  (2) 
It should be emphasized that in mentioning cross subsidy we do not pretend to be dealing 
with the more complex issue of predatory pricing which is sometimes  associated with it. Williamson 
(1977) and Baumol(1979) have emphasized elsewhere that predatory pricing involves strategic and 
timing elements which no static test of cross subsidy can encompass. 
This impression has been confirmed in conversation with Panzar and Willig, who have sug- 
gested that it may be worth reexamining their analysis in light of what is now known about the shape 
of the locus. Where the iso profit locus in price space has been used before, it has been used for other 
purposes not related directly to the regulatory issues that have  just been listed, and which constitute 
the subject of this paper. 
If this cost function is to be interpreted as  that obtained from duality analysis of the produc- 
tion set, it must be assumed that the firm employs efficient factor proportions  so that the firm's 
operations occur in the efficient  region  of the production  set. However, our analysis does not 
require this assumption.  We may take the cost function to be whatever its degree of efficiency 
dictates, so long as that cost function can be assumed to be given. 650  1  THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
FIGURE  1 
A  PRICE-IS0  RETURN  LOCUS 
COMPETITIVE  PRICE 
This is the equation of the price-iso return locus, the locus of all price vectors 
which just yield the "fair  rate of return"  to the regulated firm. 
Restricting price changes to two products, we can show the price-iso return 
locus in a two dimensional graph (Figure 1) in price space. To suggest its nature 
think in  terms of a case that often appears in  regulatory discussions: a firm, 
one of whose products is sold in markets in which the seller holds a monopoly, 
while the other product of the firm has at least some  competitor^.^ 
Under plausible assumptions, the price-iso return locus will be shown to 
have the form depicted in  Figure  1 over the relevant range. Intuitively, the 
negatively sloped segment of the locus AC (with price of the competitive good 
pC<pc2) is the relation most commonly expected-here,  if only the price of the 
competitive product, pc,  is reduced, the rate of return falls. Therefore, to keep 
the rate of return constant, the monopoly price, pin, must be increased. Thus, 
the locus has a negative slope in this region. 
But it is not generally recognized5 that the curve will normally have a posi- 
tively sloping segment, one which has important implications for policy because 
it represents vectors of inefficient prices. To the right of point C, any rise in the 
price  of  the  competitive product  begins  to  erode its  market  sufficiently  to 
reduce the rate of return. In this interval, therefore, a rise in pc requires an 
It is somewhat misleading to refer to the market for such goods as "competitive,"  rather 
than "oligopolistic,"  but the former usage is more common in applied regulatory discussions. The 
distinction between the competitive and the monopoly  products plays no significant role in the 
analysis and is used primarily for mnemonic convenience. 
In our analysis, as in reality, the price of the "competitive"  product is not fixed by impersonal 
market forces, though they may well influence its magnitude. Rather, the price is selected by the 
regulator or by the regulated firm, whose decision is subject to review by the regulator. 
Thus, for example, in Panzar and Willig (1977)the price-iso profit loci for multiproduct firms 
are drawn to be negatively  sloping throughout, having neither the horizontal rightward segment 
DE nor the upward-sloping  segment, CD, depicted in Figure 1. It may be noted, incidentally, that 
there is a minor conceptual difference between the Panzar-Willig loci and ours. Theirs depict all 
price  vectors  which  keep total  profits  constant while  ours represent  all prices  which  yield  the 
same rate of return, because we are dealing with rate of return regulation. However, the two curves 
coincide when total profit is zero, i.e., when the regulated rate of return equals the cost of capital. BAUMOL, FISCHER AND TEN RAA  1  651 
accompanying  rise  in pn' if  rate of  return  (R - C)lk  is  to remain  constant. 
Consequently, the slope of  segment CD  of  the locus is positive. Finally, at 
price pCrpC3 the firm  is  driven  out of  the competitive market  alt~gether.~ 
Therefore, any further rise in pCwill make no difference to (R - C)lk, which 
now becomes a function of pnQ1one.  Thus, to the right of pa the locus will be 
horizontal, because the monopoly price will be fixed at p"'  , the level which, 
by itself, suffices to yield the fair rate of return. 
A price-iso  return locus of  the shape depicted has some immediate  im- 
plications for regulatory policy: 
(1) Referring to Figure 1, suppose the price of the competitive product is set 
at pc2.(This is the price at which the corresponding price for the monopoly 
product is minimized.) And suppose that competitors argue that pa is less than 
"fully  distributed  cost,"  however they  may calculate it. Then, a decision to 
force a rise in  the competitive price, allegedly to protect the interests of the 
customers of the monopoly product, must, because of the positive slope of the 
locus to the right of C, cause buyers of both the competitive product and the 
monopoly product to pay higher prices. No one gains except the competitor 
of the regulated firm. 
(2) Any  price for the competitive product below pcl can reasonably  be 
considered to involve a cross subsidy. That is, it requires buyers of the monopoly 
product to pay a price higher than the price pn"', which they would pay if  the 
competitive output were eliminated altogether from the regulated firm's product 
line. Thus, a competitive price pC  <pcl  can be said to impose a burden on the 
consumers of other company products. 
It follows from all this that any price vector which involves neither cross 
subsidy nor any opportunity cost to all customer groups must be represented 
by points on the segment BC. 
(3) To relate our construct to standard welfare analysis, we shall also show 
that  the  Ramsey  price  combination  for  the  regulation  firm,  i.e., the  price 
combination which  is Pareto optimal subject to the constraint that the firm 
earn its fair rate of return, will (under certain appropriate assumptions, which 
we specify later) never lie above the price range in the acceptable segment, BC. 
But, while the Ramsey point must lie to the left ofpC2  in Figure 1, it may fall to 
the left of p".  Thus, the Ramsey prices will not fall in the inefficient, upward 
sloping portion  of  the  price-iso  return  locus, but  may  conceivably  involve 
some cross subsidy. 
3. Derivation of  the shape of  the locus 
By  inspection of our basic relationship  (2) we observe that the price-iso 
return locus for any pair of products is an iso excess profit curve in the price 
plane. This observation permits us to carry out a standard analysis of this curve. 
Throughout the graphic analysis, all prices but those for one of the competitive 
products and  one of  the  monopolistic  products  are held  constant. Any  iso 
excess profit curve is then characterized by 
There need be no sharp corner atpcJ-the  firm may be driven out of the competitive market 
gradually. However, though it makes no difference for the analysis, it is perhaps plausible  that 
there typically will be some  price at which the firm will lose its market completely to its competitors. 652  1  THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
To provide a geometric interpretation of this equation, we define in  the usual 
way the locus direction vector as (dpc,dpm),  and the excess profit gradient as 
(anlapc,  anlap").  It will be recalled that n is a function of p alone, so that this 
must also be true of its partial derivatives, the gradient. Hence at every point 
in the price plane we can draw in gradient (anlapc,anlapm).  Equation (3) is 
equivalent to the statement that the inner product of the locus direction vector, 
(dpc,dpm),  and the excess profit gradient, (anlapc,anlapm),  is zero, that is, 
the  locus  is  everywhere  perpendicular  to  the  gradient,  (anlapc,dnldpm). 
Clearly, the shape of  the locus is determined by  dnlapc and anlapm  as func- 
tions of p .7 
By definition, any anlapi indicates the effect of a change in pi on n,  when 
all other prices of our firm are held c~nstant.~  At a zero price for commodity i, 
its profit contribution will be zero or negative, while at a price sufficiently high, 
it will be priced out of the market altogether. We follow the usual premise that 
in the intermediate region its profit contribution will have a unique maximum 
which is approached gradually from either direction. In these circumstances, 
if  we  let pi vary from zero through  infinity, n  must  initially increase, then 
decrease, and become constant when pi becomes so large that product i is 
driven from the market, so that further increases in i are irrelevant. That is, 
anlapi will be positive, negative, and zero in these respective regions. In par- 
ticular, for every value of pm,  anlapc will be positive for small values of pC, 
negative for intermediate values of pC,  and zero for high values of pc. Hence 
we have three regions in the (pc,pm)-plane,  such that dnldpc is positive in the 
western region, negative in  the more or less vertical central region, and con- 
stant in the eastern regi~n.~  Similarly, we have three other regions, such that 
anldpl"  is positive in the southern region, negative in the more or less horizontal 
central region, and constant in the northern region. Combining these observa- 
tions, it follows that the price plane can be divided into nine regions, such that in 
each of  them  the gradient  (anlapc,dnlapm)  points  in  the general  direction 
indicated in Figure 2. 
However, in reality only part of the price plane may be relevant. To illus- 
trate  how this may  occur we  assume that the demand  for the monopolistic 
product is sufficiently inelastic that dnldpn' > O.1° The absence of competition, 
It may seem that the shape is also directly dependent on the cross partial derivative a2rl 
apcapm.  This cross partial does, of course, have anindirect influence, but when we use (3) to analyze 
the shape of the locus, it is clear that the value of the cross partial enters the matter only through 
its effects on ar/apc and arIapfiL. 
On the other hand, competitors'  prices are not taken to be given. Presumably, our firm 
will have some conjectures about the reactions of rivals, perhaps based on experience, and this 
will determine the firm's views about the precise shape of the locus. 
The values of the second-order derivatives cannot change these relationships. Whether, 
for example, a2rlapc2  is negative or positive, the qualitative properties of the first derivatives in 
the three regions will be unaffected, since they follow from our three basic premises for every value 
of pin:  the uniqueness of the value of pc  which maximizes profit, the gradual approach of T from 
either direction to its maximal value, and the existence of a finite value of pc  beyond which that 
product  is  driven from the market.  Cross effects only  influence the  shapes of  the boundaries 
between the regions. To illustrate this, consider a border point at which there is a nonzero cross 
effect. For example, let a2rlaprap'"  be positive at a point between the western and central regions. 
Then the border will not be vertical there, but will have a positive slope. For then one can enter 
the western region, where a~1ap"is  positive, just by moving upward, that is, by increasingp"', since 
that will then raise 8~18~~. 
lo It is easily shown (and is intuitively  clear) that if  demand for the monopoly  product is 
inelastic, only strong complementarity in the demands for pairs of products can cause this inequality 
to be violated. BAUMOL, FISCHER AND TEN RAA  I  653 
FIGURE 2 
DIRECTION OF THE GRADIENT (a-rriapc,a-rriapm) IN 9  SUBREGIONS  OF THE  PRICE  PLANE 
COMPETITIVE  PRICE 
of course, reduces the elasticity of the firm's demand curve, so that this premise 
is not  implausible.  Now the price  plane  is restricted  to the southern region 
in Figure 2, which we may consider the relevant range. 
Since  the  price-iso  return  locus  is  everywhere  perpendicular  to  the 
gradient,  over the relevant  range  it  must  decrease throughout  the  western 
subregion, increase in the central subregion, and be horizontal in the eastern 
subregion. These are the basic properties  of  the locus which are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
With the aid of Proposition 1 (below) we prove that the slope of the seg- 
ment AC of the locus, the portion of the segment to the left of the minimum, 
will be steeper (i) the greater the elasticity of demand of the monopoly product, 
(ii) the smaller the elasticity of  demand  of  the competitive product, (iii) the 
greater the ratio of the marginal cost of the competitive product to its price, and 
(iv) the smaller the ratio of marginal cost of the monopoly product to its price. 
In addition, we prove that the slope of  CD, the rising segment of  the locus, 
will be greater the greater the demand elasticity of either product and the smaller 
the ratio of marginal cost to price of either product. 
One can prove these results with the aid of  a slightly more formal char- 
acterization of the shape of the locus, providing an explicit expression for its 
derivative, dpmldpc.  For this purpose, let Ri = piyi  be total revenue of product i 
and let Efrepresent  the elasticity of  demand  for product  i  with  respect to 
price j. In addition, we define the marginal cost-price ratio Mi= (C + r*k)ilpi. 
Here (C + r*k), = d(C + r*k)ldyi is the marginal cost when  cost of  capital 
equals the  fair rate  of  return,  and  where  the subscript  denotes partial  dif- 
ferentiation with respect to the indicated variable. The slope of  the price-iso 
return locus is then determined by Proposition 1. 654  /  THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Proposition I. 
where in  the summation j refers to all of  the firm's products, including c,  m, 
and any other items it produces. 
Proof.  Differentiating (2) totally, we  have  xi(d.rrlapi)dpi = 0. In  particular, 
setting dpi = 0 for i f c,  i f m, we obtain (a.rrlapc)dpc + (a.rrlapm)dpm = 0 or 
(pclpm)(dpmldpc) = (-pca.rrl~pc)l(pma.rrl~pm).  we Clearly,  have  to  show  that 
pia.rrldpi = Ri + CjRj(1 - Mj)Ej.  Using  subscripts  to  denote  partial  dif-
ferentiation,  we  obtain from  (I), a.rrlapi = yi + Cj  (pj - Cj - r*kj)ayjlapi. 
Multiplying through by pi, and multiplying and dividing the jth term in  the 
summation sign by p-iyj, we  obtain pianlapi = ptyi + Cjp5j(pj - Cj - r*kj)l 
pj(pi/y)dyjiapi = R~ + xjRYI - M,)E{. 
From this result it is easy to deduce some of  the relationships between 
elasticities and cross elasticities of demands for the two products and the slope 
of the price-iso return locus that were described in the text preceding Proposi- 
tion 1. For this purpose we do, however, assume, in addition, that Mj < 1 for 
all products, i.e., that every product's price is above its marginal cost." 
There is another previously  unrecognized  feature of the price-iso return 
locus  which  has  not  yet  emerged  from the  discussion.  Figure  3  represents 
a surface showing the firm's rate of return, rCP, as a function of its prices.12 
Settingr(p) = r* for various values ofr* means that the "rate of return hill" 
in  Figure 3 is cut by  horizontal planes  whose intersections are the price-iso 
l1 Whether or not this is true for any particular regulated firm is a matter for empirical investiga- 
tion. However, we may note that if the firm is subject to economies of scale, it must lose money 
unlesssome Mj < 1. We may note also that while in our analysis marginal cost is well defined, some 
Averch-Johnson bias may enter if  r* is not equal to the cost of capital. 
l2 This graph is derived from specific demand and cost functions. For simplicity, the demand 
and  cost  curves are linear and  independent,  though  we  have  other examples involving  inter- 
dependence, and they have the same qualitative properties. The demand functions used are 
Operating costs are assumed to be proportional to outputs: 
C(y)  = Cmym+ CCyC.  (ii) 
If total required capital is constant, e.g., k(y) = 1, then rate of return is given by 
(pm- Cm)(l - pm) + (pc - Cc)(l - pC)  if  0=  pm,  pC s 1 
(pn' - - pm)  if  0 spm  s 1  and  pc > 1 
(P" - CC)(l - pC)  if  0s pC s  1  and  pm > 1 
=  if  pm,  pC > 1.  (iii) io 
The shape of r(p)  is represented for C, = 114  and C, = 112. The point of maximum return 
can be shown to be r(p) = 13/64 for pm = 314  and pc = 518. BAUMOL, FISCHER AND TEN RAA  1  655 
FIGURE 3 
THE  RATE  OF  RETURN,  r(p), AS  A  FUNCTION  OF  PRICES  pm AND  pC 
return loci in Figure 4.13 This shows that the price-iso return locus of Figure  1 
is only a segment of a more symmetric locus, such as ST  and WV in Figure 4, 
whose  relation  is like that between  the usual negatively  sloped indifference 
curve and the closed indifference locus obtained when one considers product 
quantities beyond the point of  consumer satiety. Note that such a complete 
price-iso return locus will characteristically have two horizontal and two vertical 
segments corresponding to a price of one product which drives it completely 
from the market, while the other is priced just  sufficiently below or just  suf- 
ficiently above  the profit  maximizing price  to yield  exactly  the  authorized 
rate of return, r*. 
Incidentally, Figure 4 also shows that a constraint on the rate of  return 
alone does not necessarily lead to a socially desirable outcome. With a given 
value of r*, the firm may choose a combination of two high prices (e.g., point 
E) which  is  even  worse  for  consumers  than  the  profit-maximizing  price 
combination (point 1). l4 
l3 Using the transformation pm = pm' + (1 + Cm)/2and pC = pC' + (1 + C,)/2,the iso return 
locus can be rewritten  as pm'2+ pc'2 = ((1 + Cm)/2)2 + ((1 + Cc)/2)2- r*. This describes circles 
with the center at pm2= (1 + Cm)/2and pC2= (1 + CC)/2, within the unit square 0 5 p"', p"  5  1. 
The simple functions used here require sharp kinks at the point where alinear segment of alocus  joins 
its curved segment. 
l4 In this case, even the firm is made better off by certain combinations of lower prices, which, 
however, violate the regulatory constraint. 656  /  THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
FIGURE 4 
A  SERIES  OF  PRICE-IS0  RETURN  LOCI  IN AN EXAMPLE WITH  LINEAR  DEMAND CURVES 
W 
T 
I  , pc
518  1 

= pC2  = pc3 

COMPETITIVE  PRICE 
If the amount of capital needed increases with output, as one would nor- 
mally  expect, then at low prices,  where  output is  high  and more capital is 
used, a higher amount of profit is required to yield the same rate of return. This 
means that for a given value of r*,  the profit hill of Figure 3 is intersected by 
surfaces that slope downward from the origin towards higher prices (and then 
become flat where prices are sufficiently high to reduce demand to zero). As a 
result, the price-iso return loci in Figure 4 will shift towards the upper right. 
4. Relationship to Ramsey pricing 
We  turn  next to the conjecture (which will be proved  under  somewhat 
restrictive  assumptions) that the point representing a Ramsey price vector15 
always falls in  the efficient region in  which it is not possible for the firm to 
reduce all of its prices without a reduction in its rate of return (segment AC in 
Figure  1 or 4). But it has also been shown that Ramsey prices need not meet 
the burden test (that is, it  may  lie in  segment AB  in  Figure  1 or 4). Here, 
Ramsey prices are defined, as usual, as the vector of prices which is Pareto 
optimal subject to the pertinent budget (rate of return) constraint. 
We shall make the following assumption, which seems quite natural: 
Assumption I.  The demand functions are such that if allpi 5 pi'(i = 1, . . . ,n), 
the firm's capital use will increase or at least not decline. 
'j  See, for example, Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1971). BAUMOL, FISCHER AND TEN RAA  1  657 
That is, if  all prices are reduced or at least remain constant, then, since 
we expect the demand for most products either increases or remains constant, 
capital use will not decline. We also use 
Assumption 2. The firm actually earns rate of return, r", imposed by regulation. 
Then we have 
Proposition 2. If the interests of competitors do not enter the calculation or if 
they are constrained by competition, regulation, or other circumstances to earn 
zero economic profit (i.e., their rate of return equals their cost of capital), then 
if pp  is the Ramsey price vector,  there cannot exist another price vector p* 
which also satisfies the rate of return constraint and for which pi" 5 pipfor a11 i. 
Proof.  Consider  two  price  vectors  (pl,  . . . ,pfL)and  (pl', . . . ,p"')  with 
pi 5 pi', i = 1, . . . , n, where  strict inequality  applies  in  at least one com-
ponent and with  identical  rates of  return, r(pl, . . . ,p") = r(pl', . . . ,pn'). 
Since no price inp is higher than the corresponding price inp', and at least one 
is lower, consumers' surplus must be greater underp. The rate of  return of the 
firm is, by hypothesis, the same underp andp'. But since by Assumption 1 it 
must use no smaller an amount of capital (at a price assumed to be fixed), and 
since by Assumption 2 it earns at least the fair rate of return on its capital under 
either price vector, its total net profit cannot be lower under p. Since the price 
vector (pl,  . . . ,pIL)leaves all consumers better off than (pl', . . . ,p7"), and 
does not harm the supplier, and since either no other firm is involved or its net 
economic profit (producers' rent) is fixed, (pl', . . . ,p"') cannot be a Ramsey 
price vector. This completes the proof  of Proposition 2, and shows that the 
Ramsey price vector cannot fall in any positively sloping segment of the price-iso 
return locus. 
Of  course, in practice, competing firms will often benefit if  the regulated 
firm is forced to adopt the higher prices, and this leaves us with a problem 
which is, as yet, unsettled: should the effects upon competing firms enter the 
Ramsey calculation and, if  so, how? 
Faulhaber and Zajac (1976) have proved the following proposition  in  an 
unpublished paper. 
Proposition 3. Ramsey prices need not pass the burden test. 
This implies that the prohibition of cross subsidies, which is often regarded 
as a  criterion  of  fair pricing  practices, may  in  fact reduce total welfare.  It 
raises interesting issues about the basis upon which a tradeoff between the two 
should be decided upon, a topic which, however, goes beyond the bounds of 
our subject. It is easy to prove Proposition  3 by  counterexample, as is done 
by Faulhaber (1975, p. 973 ff.). 
5. Concluding comment 
In this paper we have sought to describe graphically, in  both the literal 
and figurative sense, the range of price options available to a regulator using 
a rate of return ceiling to restrict profits. At least in principle, the price-iso return 
locus should be amenable to econometric estimation16 and may therefore be 
l6  It should be clear from equation (1) that the econometric problems involved in estimation 
of the price-iso return locus are neither more nor less than those besetting the estimation of its 658  /  THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
helpful in depicting clearly to regulatory agencies the full menu of choices before 
them. Perhaps more important, it should dramatize the damage to consumer 
welfare of pricing decisions often urged upon regulators by competitors of the 
regulated firms who claim that prices current or proposed are improper because 
they do not exceed "fully  distributed costs,"  however defined. If the result is 
to drive the price vector into a positively  sloping segment of the locus, the 
consumers of every product must end up the losers. 
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demand and cost functions. In saying this we do not intend to minimize the difficulties involved in 
estimation of demand and cost relationships. Rather, we mean only to indicate that the price-iso 
return locus introduces no new and unrecognized econometric issues. You have printed the following article:
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